



Diversity or Exclusion? Psychoanalysis ‘Explains’

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Introduction

In this article I am not going to offer the kind of ‘integration’ of different considerations of ‘race, caste, class’ suggested by the title of the panel from which this piece derives.¹ It is too big a task and in any case leaves out a lot of other intersectional factors such as gender, sex, sexuality, religion, disability. What can be done, perhaps is to begin to think through the ways in which these and other elements of social positioning produce specific textures of force, violence, care, minoritisation, destructiveness and possibility. For example, the COVID pandemic must be seen as intricately bound up with the structures of inequality and oppression that continue to work the world, and in which psychoanalysis is mired without always reflecting on that fact. We have seen in the pandemic how some lives have been made to matter more than others, how some populations are disposable in the interests of economic and political concerns that derive from failures of care and in some countries – Brazil is an exemplar – a masculinist denialism that has the flavour of murderous psychopathy.

The question this raises, to my mind, is not so much the tolerance of difference or the encouragement of a deepened acceptance of diversity, desirable though these things clearly are. It is rather whether it is possible to construct and sustain an *ethic* that resists oppression and extends grievability to all who suffer, asserting the primacy of relations of care in establishing what it means to be a human subject as well as a humane one (Butler, 2020). If we can think our way through this, it will be along the lines of psychoanalysis’ insistence that all subjects have their own reality, their singularity, and that this makes them grievable, so their lives matter. In doing this, psychoanalysis needs to reflect back on its own practices of exclusion – discrimination by class, sexuality and race have all featured over the years and continue to do so – something it has started to do, however falteringly. It also needs to make itself available for thinking about those spaces where injustice occurs and for contesting them.

Anti-Blackness and Antisemitism

Exclusions take place across many domains – sexuality, gender, class, nationality – and in many circumstances. All these need to be observed and documented, but it is probably fair to say that the racialisation of exclusion is paramount. This is part of the argument promoted by Afropessimism, that black life is premised on anti-black racism and is excluded from ‘civilisation’ by the ubiquity and perennial nature of racism:

¹ Psychoanalysis and the Public Sphere Panel, September 2021: *Diversity as Panacea?: Integrating Considerations of Race, Caste and Class*. This article is dedicated to the memory of Amal Treacher Kabesh, friend and colleague, who chaired the panel.

The Afro-pessimists are theorists of Black positionality who share Fanon's insistence that, though Blacks are . . . sentient beings, the structure of the entire world's semantic field . . . is sutured by anti-Black solidarity. (Wilderson, 2010, p.58)

The power of this claim about anti-blackness is the way it throws into consciousness the impossibility of living outside the structures of racism. Slavery was the institutionalised origin of this, constructed by and feeding into the discourse of black non-humanity; the abolition of slavery did not remove this – indeed, slavery has been perpetuated in the form of discrimination against black people everywhere colonialism operated. To use the trope activated by Christina Sharpe (2016), we all live 'in the wake' of slavery, a wake that widens with time; yet, pushing this further, those who are most in the wake – the descendants of slaves and the inheritors of the mantle of slavery – are now bordered by it, so that they are distinct from those outside the wake, who are nevertheless impacted upon by its flow and force. Expressed more simply, let us just say that in this view, the lives of black people are radically differentiated from the lives of white people; and the barrier between them, which is anti-black racism, structures this differentiation as subjugation and exclusion.

Can we say that this really is the way the world is divided up? Some psychoanalytically inclined theorists have certainly objected to it. For instance, McIvor (2020, p.44) summarises some basic principles of Afropessimism and then comments that they 'seem fundamentally incommensurable with both the therapeutic ethic undergirding psychoanalysis and a democratic praxis of mourning.' Drawing on a Kleinian framework, McIvor comments that 'It is far too tempting to map Afropessimism using Klein's concept of "positions" – to see the exaggerated and unceasing wakefulness as resting on paranoid-schizoid assumptions about social life and others.' McIvor then goes on to wonder (Ibid.) 'Yet it is the fantasy of annihilating the order of anti-Blackness – bringing about the end of the world – that animates the core of Afropessimism as articulated by Wilderson and others. Isn't a reparative politics of the depressive position inherently preferable to the sheer antagonism and cleansing violence of the paranoid-schizoid position?'

To be fair, McIvor (p.45) immediately qualifies this by noting how it feeds into a pathologising stance that 'deploys the authority of the (white) analyst to discipline and categorise a resistant analysand, and to interpret their resistances – towards mediation, commensuration, agency or compromise – as symptoms of an illness.' Nevertheless, the stance he takes is one in which the antagonisms worked on by Afropessimism are best thought of as a component of a necessary move towards mourning that fuels democracy, attesting 'to the historical and enduring injuries of white supremacy while it directs hatred towards domination and loving repair towards the spaces and practices of self-government' (McIvor, 2020, p.46).

It is not for me to make a judgment on Afropessimism, though it is noteworthy that critics from within Black Studies are not all convinced by it. Fred Moten (2013), for example, positioning himself as a sympathetic critic 'in apposition to Afro-pessimism'

(p.739), clarifies and expands the Afropessimist notion that the black subject is ‘nothing’ to demand that that ‘nothing’ is examined in its own terms for what it is constituted as – not, therefore, an absent nothing but a present one, with its own life and its own possibilities. He asks (p.778), ‘What if blackness is the name that has been given to the social field and social life of an illicit alternative capacity to desire? Basically, that is precisely what I think blackness is.’ There are hints of where this might lead. For Moten (p. 742) ‘Celebration is the essence of black thought, the animation of black operations, which are, in the first instance, our undercommon, underground, submarine sociality.’ For Sharpe (2016), awakening (wake-fulness) occurs partly when one recognises the persistence of thoughtfulness and care in maintaining black lives in the wake of slavery. Clearly, these are modes of resistance that arise from the perception of the ubiquity of anti-black racism but fill out the space of black lives as *lives*, not just as social or actual deaths. That said, the shared perspective remains: the power of racism is such as to structure the world into those who have a place in it (are grievable, in that other terminology) and those who do not.

Antisemitism has some of these dynamics and yet also its own specific history. The exclusion of Jews from the realm of the human did not begin with the Nazis. If the dehumanisation of the black subject was a foundation for, as well as a consequence of, colonialism, the pursuit of Jews into colonial areas was one of the features of the same historical period. The main target of the Inquisition in Latin America as well as in Spain and Portugal was the so-called crypto-Jews whose existence, both real and imagined, threatened to corrupt the self-proclaimed truth of the Christian church. This linkage of anti-black racism and antisemitism (both of these terms being anachronistic to this original context) continues into the current era, despite the immense shifts in the position of many Western Jewish communities in terms of affluence and security and the complications for anti-oppressive political alliances created by the State of Israel.

For white racists, who might support Israel as part of their anti-black, anti-Muslim and anti-Palestinian agenda, Jews are still the arch-enemy, for example the force behind so-called white replacement and the imagined ‘flooding’ of the West by migrants (‘You will not replace us’ merging with ‘the Jews will not replace us’ in the alt-right demonstrations of Trump-era America). Because the antisemitic and anti-black stereotypes involve the Jews being clever and manipulative and black people being manipulable and ‘primitive’, the sources of racial unease and threat must be Jewish, flowing from an international conspiracy to rule the world, with one powerful Jewish tactic being undermining of the ‘white race’. The irony of the question of how Jews feature as non-white in this phantasmagoria, but as white in most anti-racist discourse, is marked; the point here, however, is that the Jewish-black ‘alliance’ in terms of being the excluded other is both historical and contemporary.

This is not to deny the differences, of course: anti-Judaism was a precursor of antisemitism that relied primarily on *religious* discrimination with especially strong Christian forms (Muslim anti-Judaism was more variable and was marked by more pronounced periods of inactivity and relative tolerance of Jews (Nirenberg, 2013)).

Whilst this also applied to colonial forced conversion and genocide of indigenous peoples – who were sometimes understood as ‘Jewish’ (Slabodsky, 2014) – Christian supersessionism ensured that the attitude towards Jews was that of those who were excluded, or had somehow excluded themselves, from the community of the saved, and therefore were abhorrent living ghosts, relics of a pre-salvific time that by their very existence denied theological truth. Christianity re-read Judaism through its own eyes, a fact that amongst other things shows how the term ‘Judeo-Christian’ when applied to ‘Western civilisation’ is at best a misnomer, at worst a way of reinforcing the obliteration of a specifically Jewish history and consequently a form of antisemitism in itself. Conversion could help remedy Jewish obscurantism, but as the Inquisition demonstrated, not securely or convincingly. The division between white Christian and Jew was arguably the primary division in Europe until the mid-twentieth century, however significant anti-black racism built on slavery also was, yet this is often overlooked in the contemporary positioning of at least Ashkenazi (European) Jews as ‘white’. In contrast, as Brickman (2003) notes, there is plenty of evidence of the association between blackness and Jews, at least until the Holocaust. She comments (p.15), ‘The rhetorics of colonialism and antisemitism converged: in Freud’s Vienna, the language of racial inferiority was used not only for dark-skinned peoples in such places as Africa, Australia, and the Americas but also for the Jews of Europe, who were variously described as “Oriental,” “primitive,” “barbarian,” “white Negroes,” “mulatto,” and “a mongrel race.”’

These two exclusions, of blackness and Jewishness, run together in many ways, despite their different histories. What has psychoanalysis to do with them? In a recent volume dedicated to the relationship between psychoanalysis and liberation psychology, which amongst other things demonstrates how strong an influence the former was on the latter, Daniel José Gaztambide (2019) discusses sympathetically Freud’s own appreciation of American black struggles with racism, documenting Freud’s awareness in this field to offset other demonstrations of his rootedness in colonial modes of thought.

Freud’s conception of his Jewish identity within his immediate historical context, was one of belonging to a people who sustained constant marginalisation due to European society’s imaginary and mythical equation of Jewishness and Blackness, a relationship Freud in his own myth-making saw the Jewish people repressed time and again in their collective memory, yet which returned time and again without end. (p.82)

The association of Jewishness with blackness within psychoanalysis usually is constituted as a relation mediated by antisemitism – that the ‘Jewish science’, because of its origins in the marginalised and minoritised history of the Jews in Europe, can be both sympathetic to and inspirational of black struggle. Gaztambide pushes this parallel more strongly than just seeing Freud’s and psychoanalysis’ immersion in antisemitism as a prompt for its analysis of anti-black racism and its siding with the oppressed, suggesting that Freud’s identification with blackness was substantive in its own right. ‘The relationship between Blackness and Jewishness,’ he claims (p. 25), ‘occupied Freud’s mind, and it would seem, that of the early psychoanalysts as well.’ There is certainly some evidence for this. Gaztambide draws for example on a clinical note by Lawrence Ginsburg (1999) that describes ‘Fragments from the analyses of two American

psychiatrists (whose formative years were centered in the post-Civil War South)' and claims that 'Although the European anti-Semitism faced by Sigmund Freud was particularly relevant to his personal and professional identities, he was not unmindful of conflictual "race, creed and color" paradigms peculiar to the "New World"' (Ginzburg, 1999, p.243). More generally,

In his own discussion of his 'Moorishness,' the associations between Jewishness and Blackness, and discussions with colleagues over anti-Semitism and anti-Black racism, Freud evidenced his identification with Blackness as a Jew. In his clinical work, we can see his ability to interpret the triangulated relationship between a Jew and his struggle with an ambivalent conflict between Whiteness and Blackness structured by America's racial imaginary. (Gaztambide, 2019, p. 29)

There is something to be said in favour of this reading, even if it is founded on relatively tenuous evidence. Not surprisingly, Freud's own references to 'black' in his writings are not about black people – they mostly concern black hair or beards or clothes. His use of the more common terminology of his time, 'Negro', is also restricted, mainly to a racist joke about his lack of patients (Freud, 1924). Apart from this and some use of the term in *Totem and Taboo*, in which black Africans and indigenous Australians are the topic, there is relatively little to distinguish Freud's attitudes from that of other liberal Europeans, although one early comment to his fiancée Martha about John Stuart Mill is interestingly ambiguous: 'In all his writings it never appears that the woman is different from the man, which is not to say she is something less, if anything the opposite. For example, he finds an analogy for the oppression of women in that of the Negro. Any girl, even without a vote and legal rights, whose hand is kissed by a man willing to risk his all for her love, could have put him right on this' (Freud, 1883, p.76). What this shows, at least, is that however familiarly sexist he might have been in his comments on women, which suggest that he did not see them as subjugated (he was clearly no feminist), Freud did at least appreciate the reality of the oppression of American black people.

That said, a more compelling association comes from Freud's last great work, *Moses and Monotheism* (1939). This has been much discussed (e.g. Frosh, 2005; Said, 2003) but for present purposes it is the famous claim by Freud that the Biblical Moses was an Egyptian that is the key point. This is read by many, most notably Edward Said, as an indication of Freud's willingness to embrace a view of identity, including religious or ethnic identity – that is, in his case, Jewish identity – as given from outside, in the sense of being formed not as an intrinsic property of a person or group, but as a kind of intrusion, or at least an externally applied grid. As Said (2003, p.53) notes, this fractures any possible claims to an essential national or racial identity; it represents 'Freud's profound exemplification of the insight that even for the most definable, the most identifiable, the most stubborn communal identity – for him, this was the Jewish identity – there are inherent limits that prevent it from being fully incorporated into one, and only one, Identity.' This very convincing reading can be supplemented by an additional point, recognisable in Said's account but here articulated by Gaztambide (2019, p. 79):

Freud's positioning of Moses as a non-White, non-European, non-Jewish Other who constitutes Jewishness as such is also an attempt to reconcile a theme... - the equation of Jewishness with Blackness, of being 'White-but-not-quite'... Given how Egypt itself was *the geographical tissue that connected Africa, the Mediterranean, and Europe*, I argue that this reflects Freud's ambivalent attempt to rework his own relationship to Blackness, and the association embedded in his racist European culture between Blackness and Jewishness... In this, his final text, Freud wrestles with a wound upon history which will not be forgotten, and which, in his eyes, impacted the Jewish people – the wound of anti-Blackness, anti-Semitism, and the quandary of the non-White.

The *Africanness* of Moses is the essential point here, not to oppose one essential identity against another, but rather to disrupt the assumption that identity is something formed and solidified from within an already-established national or racialised group. Recall that Freud (1913) opposes the 'civilised' European to the 'savage' indigenous Australian or black African; yet here we have this same 'savage' creating what for Freud is a high form of civilisation, its prototype and most ethically sound manifestation – the monotheistic religion of Judaism. Psychoanalysis itself is identified with this in Freud's last thoughts and writings, as he references the flight from Nazism as equivalent to the Jews' exile after the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem and the preservation of Judaism through study (Freud, 1939, p.114; Diller 1991, p.206). Thus, Africanness – blackness – is the supposedly 'uncivilised' force that in actuality opposes fascism and Nazism and can be traced back to the origins of civilisation itself, as its source. The Jews are black not just as an antisemitic trope of disparagement and exclusion from the European norm, but also as a culture that opposes the barbarism to which European society has reverted.

In *Moses and Monotheism*, Freud posits that the demands of the Egyptian Moses on his people were too great for them to sustain, resulting in their assassination of him with subsequent regret and guilt and repression of the memory of the murderous act. Yet eventually, in Freud's own writings, the debt to this Moses comes back into focus and the black source of Judaism is honoured. Gaztambide's (2019, p.82) summary focuses on this idea in an instructive way, even if its rendering of Freud's psychology is speculative:

Freud then wrestles with his existential reality as a Jew by reconfiguring his relationship to Blackness as both cause of his depression (e.g. the association between anti-Jewishness and anti-Blackness), as well as a source of survival and liberation.

Maybe; but even if this is not completely convincing as a speculative analysis of Freud's 'own myth-making', it pounces on something that is productive in the theorising of anti-oppressive relationships. This is the observation that the link between Jews and black people, with all its current antagonisms taken into account, is and has been one of overlapping identifications in the context of histories that certainly have their vital specificities (anti-Judaism, black slavery) yet through these also have their productive and indissoluble alliances.

Psychoanalysis Explains...

Post-Freud, both the differences and the alliances have been visible. As some recent histories of psychoanalysis have emphasised (Zaretsky, 2015; Gaztambide, 2019), there has been more connection between psychoanalysis and black communities than has often been recognised. In America, this had one mid-century high point in the ‘Harlem Renaissance’, the flowering of black life that was marked both by exoticism (pulling in white ‘voyeurs’) and creative consciousness-raising. Zaretsky (2015, p.40) sets the scene for this by noting that the obviousness of the intertwining of the social and personal worlds of black communities – the way in which the impact of the social environment on psychological well-being and suffering is totally immanent – means that psychoanalysis applied in that community can never be excised from social and political concerns.

Zaretsky tracks the origins of the engagement with psychoanalysis through W.E.B. Du Bois’ notion of ‘double consciousness’, the splitting of the black psyche between self-awareness and construction through the gaze of the other (Du Bois, 1902), emerging ideas of a ‘racial’ unconscious (which can also be found in Fanon (1952)) and in particular the influence of the writings of the novelist Richard Wright. Drawing on the work of Badia Sahar Ahad (2010), Gaztambide (2019, p.91) also discusses the influence of psychoanalysis on the African-American culture of New York in mid-century, as reflected in at least one significant publication, the New York City periodical *The Messenger*, a key influencer of the Harlem Renaissance. ‘For a community of people who were bound by the politics of the exterior,’ Ahad writes, ‘psychoanalysis served the desire of many African American writers and scholars who sought to promote the psychological depth of the black subject’ (p. 16).

The intellectual side of this encounter between psychoanalysis and black American culture was complemented in 1946 by the formation by Wright and the novelist Ralph Ellison along with Frederic Wertham, a Jewish psychoanalyst, of the Harlem Lafargue Mental Hygiene Clinic, which operated in the basement of a Harlem church until 1958. Zaretsky (2015) and Gaztambide (2019) both build on this history of the Harlem engagement with psychoanalysis to explore the relationship between psychoanalysis and decolonial practice, deploying Fanon and (in Gaztambide’s case) liberation psychology to that end. This is important and informative work, demonstrating amongst other things just how much accounts of the history of psychoanalysis have been narrowed to omit these progressive developments, or concentrated into discussions of Fanon as the sole voice of liberational psychoanalysis. Neglect of the black history of psychoanalysis is itself part of an exclusionary process which sees psychoanalysis as only applying to Europeans or those ‘civilised’ to European status.

In this regard, the gradual recovery of the history of psychoanalysis in Latin America and in India is also of importance (Mandelbaum, Frosh and Lima, 2021; Hartnack, 2011). The papers in Anderson et al (2011) collectively demonstrate how the enterprise of psychoanalysis contributed to the perpetration of colonial power in the twentieth century, nominating certain subject populations as potentially analysable and

hence ‘civilised’, which means convertible into Europeans or at least ‘suitably modern subjects’ (p.8), and others as ‘native’ or indigenous, and hence on the subjugated, ‘primitive’ side of things. The regulatory or disciplinary functions of this are quite apparent: ‘Psychoanalytic knowledge assisted in establishing a baseline for the native’s personality, a critical dictum for the framing of colonial educational, judicial, and administrative policies in specific locales’ (Anderson et al, 2011, p.8).

In one instance of the ambiguity of psychoanalysis in colonial contexts, the founder of the Indian Psychoanalytic Society, Girindrasekhar Bose, who dominated Indian psychoanalysis for most of his life, was clearly a highly educated, privileged colonial subject who made his living from the analysis of members of ‘the British-educated urban elite whose professional life was interwoven with the interests of the colonial rulers’ (Hartnack, 2011, p. 102). Nevertheless, he resisted much of Freud’s ethnocentric thinking and associated himself strongly with the anticolonial movement; indeed, Hartnack notes (p. 109), ‘His pronounced anticolonial attitudes were conformist within the circles to which he belonged.’ Just as significantly perhaps, his psychoanalytic work was hybrid and critical in its use of Hindu ideas and its sensitivity to the specifics of his sociocultural milieu.

Bose’s creative efforts to integrate elements from European and Bengali Hindu psychological and psychoanalytic thought and practice were unprecedented in the field of academic psychology and psychiatry in colonial times and thus were groundbreaking. Instead of the binary concept of black skin - white mask that Fanon adhered to, Bose opted for interfaces (in the very sense of the word). His work was not limited by dichotomies but rather strove to establish connections. (Hartnack, 2011, p. 109)

Hartnack may be being unfair to Fanon in this quotation, because Fanon’s supposedly ‘binary’ black-white conceptualisation of the colonial world contains within it a nuanced understanding of the multiple influences on the construction of black and white subjectivities and can be read as a polemical device to uncover the psychopolitical workings of racism that are harder to unpick through notions of hybridity. Nevertheless, noticing that the colonised users of psychoanalysis have not necessarily been anthropophagous, simply absorbing the European ‘truth’ – and indeed that when they have been so it has sometimes been in a spirit of irony – is an important step towards realising the potential of psychoanalysis itself for decolonising practice.

Resonances of this can be seen in different colonial environments in Latin America, where psychoanalysis has had a huge impact (Plotkin, 2012). For example, in Brazil psychoanalysis had a role to play as a mode of socialisation of a polity imagined to be uncontrollable in its forms of racial and sexual excess. As my Brazilian colleagues and I have described elsewhere (Rubin et al, 2016), the importation of psychoanalysis to Brazil happened early and was always ambiguously related to repressive policies (for instance, during the dictatorship of the late twentieth century) and to modernisation processes that were both emancipatory and controlling. Psychoanalysis became embroiled with the Brazilian League of Mental Hygiene, founded in 1923 as part of the project of sanitisation and hygienisation of the Brazilian population, based on eugenic

theory and aligned with the tendency to biologise madness, race and cultural aspects of society. Even though some early psychiatrists in the League developed projects that went beyond the initial eugenic framework, the country's racial mixture was seen as a problem and as a cause of Brazilian 'backwardness' that had to be overcome (Russo, 2012). In this context, the psychiatrist Julio Porto-Carrero collaborated in the creation of the psychoanalytic clinic of the League. As Russo (2012) shows, his 'educational' intervention was based on two main aims arising from the psychoanalytic theory of sexuality, both of which can be read as normalising and racialised, albeit partly in tension with one another.

One aim was to remove the taboo that surrounded sex, working towards a non-repressive morality; the second was to control and sublimate the sexual instincts towards more 'civilised' ends. Russo proposes that, although Brazilian psychoanalytic practice first developed within the domain of hygiene projects, physicians like Porto-Carrero saw in its non-moralistic attitude a way to humanise the psychiatric movement. As such, it might be claimed to have had a *decolonising* effect in relation to psychiatry, whilst still being part of a project of normalisation based around colonial fantasies of race and 'miscegenation'. Cultural appropriations of psychoanalysis are also relevant here. For example, psychoanalysis had a notable presence in the art world and in debates surrounding the Week of Modern Art, held in São Paulo in 1922. Not only did several writers and painters enter into dialogue with psychoanalysis in their works, but the main document of modernism in the period, the *Manifesto Antropofagico*, written by Oswald de Andrade (1928), mentions Freud in the context of defending an original Brazilian identity free from repression and social restrictions.

The social and cultural elites of the period also absorbed psychoanalysis in their search for modernity along European lines. On the other hand again, see-sawing between the different uses of psychoanalysis, the self-identity of Brazil as 'anthropophagous' explicitly relates to the idea of the colonised society as only developing through the materials it can ingest from the coloniser. Psychoanalysis is then one of those materials; and in being cannibalised in this way it is not destroyed, but rather consolidates from the inside a pattern of deference and control through identification and a kind of deathly possession. Anthropophagy itself, as a theme, is directly related to racist notions of cannibalism that have infected psychoanalysis throughout its history (Vyrgioti, 2018).

Perhaps the denial of race and racism in psychoanalysis can be seen in a small vignette concerning one of the originators of psychoanalysis in Brazil, Virginia Bicudo, who before becoming a psychoanalyst was a sociologist at the Free School of Sociology and Politics of São Paulo, where her Masters degree dissertation in 1945 was entitled *Estudo das atitudes raciais de pretos e mulatos em São Paulo (Study of racial attitudes of blacks and mulattos in São Paulo)*. At this time, her work on racism in Brazil was pioneering; but once she left sociology to become a hygiene educator and after that a psychoanalyst, she abandoned her research on racial themes. Indeed, she seems to have hidden her own 'mixed' background. Psychoanalysts from the Memory Centre of the Brazilian Psychoanalytic Society of São Paulo who organized an exhibition in her honour

in 2010, on the occasion of the centenary of her birth, told my colleagues that when they were examining her archives they found in her house a collection of hats that, according to them, served Bicudo as a way to hide her ‘crispy’ hair, evidence of her *mulata* condition. In other words, not only did Bicudo abandon her *studies* of racism but also, on entering the Psychoanalytic Society as one of its founders, she sought to hide her own ethnic identity. This may itself be a symptom of the limited Brazilian psychoanalytic work on racism, and indeed the relatively small number of black analysts (though there are some in Rio) or, apparently, black patients. There is another indication of this rightwards shift, which was part of a tendency within mainstream psychoanalysis: in 1964, Bicudo participated in the ‘March of Families for God and Freedom’ in the city of São Paulo in opposition to the left-wing government of João Goulart, which later that year was overthrown in the coup d’état that marked the beginning of the military regime.

Psychoanalysis thus has been entwined with issues of race, racialisation and racism in various places around the world in many periods of its history. It has been used in different ways to ‘explain’ the characteristics of racialised and minoritised groups (even when, as in India, they were actually in the majority) as part of a colonial tendency to use psychoanalysis as a tool to ‘reduce’ apparent irrationalities – which could mean practices of resistance to colonial rule and to racism – to psychological and psychopathological factors. ‘Freud explains,’ which was a common slogan among the middle and upper classes of the main cities in Brazil during the dictatorship of the 1960s and 1970s (Oliveira, 2006, p.63), invites the reduction of psychic and social suffering to personal psychic conflicts theorised by psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic concepts become in some ways ‘weaponised’ with the effect of obscuring the specificities of different cultural situations and – more to the point – the operation of oppressive power structures and the legitimacy of dissent. The recurrent issue here is that psychoanalysis is presented as a mode of *universal* knowledge that can be applied to different groups and different social contexts without much alteration; yet, in reality, it is a produce of a specific time and place, carrying considerable cultural baggage with it. This does not mean it has no value when used outside that environment, as is shown by the enormous impact of psychoanalysis in Latin America, India and more recently Japan and China (e.g. Parker, 2008).

This impact is not solely to do with colonialism and is not limited to a Europeanised elite, but also demonstrates how psychoanalysis can provide tools enabling reflection on lived experiences and cultural problematics in differing environments. However, what is clear in this is that in order to speak to and about different cultural settings and social experiences, psychoanalysis has to be sensitive to them – and especially, given its pervasiveness as well as its imbrication in the origins and history of psychoanalysis itself, to the ways in which racialisation and racist oppression operate. Psychoanalysis’ sensitivity to the questions posed by ‘blackness’ is crucial here, whether in its absence or presence; we have seen that psychoanalysis can be, and has been, used as part of anti-oppressive and antiracist practice, yet clearly this has not always been the case. ‘Psychoanalysis explains...’ is never enough, not just because psychoanalysis needs to be supplemented by other forms of critical thought and practice (though this is the

case), but also because it is thoroughly imbued with ideological and political assumptions that need always to be challenged.

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