Sickness in the Body Politic: Christopher Bollas and The Deformation of Political Spaces and Subjects
by Ryan LaMothe

Any society in which the government, the press and the leaders of opinion are disseminating little but skepticism, trickery and submissiveness is a society that is dying; it is only moralizing in order to disseminate its decay. (Mounier, 1952, p.53)

In his discussion about transformational objects/processes, Christopher Bollas (1987), almost in passing, refers to extremist political leaders who possess “a collective certainty that their revolutionary ideology will effect a total environmental transformation” (p.27). This certainty he argues bears a “trace” of early infant organizations of experience that gives rise to the revolutionary’s desire for a total transformation. This trace is inextricably part of a basic fault the revolutionary is unconsciously trying to repair. This brief reference to extremist revolutionaries suggests that Bollas considers transformation objects to be applicable to political realities, though in this case the collective certainty of revolutionaries—which Adam Phillips (1993, p.63) would deem to be a perversion—signifies a negative transformational object/process, wherein the political subjectivity of the self-certain revolutionary is partially deformed. While Bollas is more concerned with demonstrating the clinical and developmental utility of this concept, his passing remark regarding political revolutionaries suggests that transformational objects/processes are applicable to political realities.

The leap from parent-infant relations and organizations of experience to the political realm is considerable, given the extensive psychosocial developmental achievements that take place between infancy and adulthood, as well as the complex array of cultural, economic, and political variables persons encounter as children and adults. The leap raises numerous questions such as if there are traces of early infancy’s pre-representational experiences in adult activities, how influential or significant are they? To what degree, in other words, is this early period influential in adult political interactions? Do these “traces” remain unchanged as developmental capacities and experiences emerge? Are “extremist” political revolutionaries simply trying to repair a basic fault? Do we disregard or minimize the political-economic environment that gives rise to a basic fault and later the “extremist” revolutionary? Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X were considered extremists by many, mostly white, people. Both sought a transformation of the political realm. To what degree are we to understand their desire for change to be grounded in pre-verbal stage of development? To what extent are their political actions motivated by a desire to repair a basic fault? Are we to understand their revolutionary pursuits in terms of a search for a transformational object, while overlooking the racist perversion of forcing inferiority onto African Americans? These questions emerge because Bollas understands transformational objects to be associated with the earliest period of psychosocial development, which means that he did not consider transformational objects associated with each period of human development.
This said, these and other questions are not meant to imply that Bollas’ concept is not useful vis-à-vis the political realm. Instead, these questions suggest that his concept needs modifications if is to be used in assessing political realities.

In this paper, I offer an emended version of Bollas’ concept with the aim of using it to assess negative political objects/processes that deform relations and subjectivity. To move toward this goal, I begin with a depiction of Bollas’ concept, which provides an opportunity to flesh out its attributes and to proffer alterations that, I contend, are plausible given Bollas’ discussion. In this discussion I will also make a couple of changes that differ from Bollas’ notion of transformational objects. One purpose of identifying the attributes of transformational objects is to suggest that the concept is applicable to other developmental stages. The next step is to connect this concept to political realities, which requires some elaboration of political processes in order to understand similarities and differences between the communicative spaces of childhood and the communicative spaces of the political realm. Once this is established, I argue that pervasive political humiliation, which replaces civil discourse, represents negative transformation object/processes and signifies sickness in a democratic polis. I conclude with a brief discussion of those positive transformational objects/processes that serve as sites of resistance and hope.

There are several clarifications that need to be addressed before beginning. First, Freud warned about using concepts torn “from the sphere in which they have originated and been evolved” and used in non-clinical settings, possibly misusing the concept and distorting the object of investigation (Freud, 1930, p.144; see also Coles, 1975; Meissner, 1992). Of course, this did not deter Freud from using psychoanalytic concepts to interpret cultural and religious realities. While Freud’s caution is worthy of consideration, it is important to recognize that the consulting room and social-political field, while distinct, intersect in myriad of ways (Fanon, 1963, 2008/1952; LaMothe, 2017). As many analysts have noted, political-economic realities not only shape subjectivity, but also give rise to a civic or political self, which finds its way into the consulting room (e.g., Altman, 2000, 2004; Kovel, 1970; Layton, Hollander, & Gutwell, 2006; Samuels, 1993, 2004). Second and relatedly, some psychoanalysts and philosophers (e.g., Marcuse, 1964; Honneth, 1995, 2007), because of their concern about needless human suffering, have used psychoanalytic theory and concepts to diagnose social-political pathologies, as well as to consider their etiologies. Despite Freud’s caution, psychoanalytic concepts have been useful in assessing macro political, communicative processes and I contend a modified version of Bollas’ notion of transformational objects is useful in describing the social pathology represented in Trump’s (and his ardent supporters) political behavior/communication. Third, I wish to make clear that when I use Trump’s political style of communicating as an illustration I am not diagnosing Trump or suggesting he is a negative transformational object. To do so would be to give him more power than he merits and to overlook the numerous individuals who support, if not mimic, his views and behaviors. Trump, in other words, represents political behaviors, processes, and views that are extant in the body politic.

Reconsidering Transformational Objects/Processes
To emend Bollas’ notion of transformational objects requires slowing down and peering closely at what he says about this concept. I contend that by doing this it becomes evident
that transformational objects and their attributes can be understood in terms of other developmental stages and, more specifically, political realities. Let me begin with the most important feature of transformational objects and that is the parent and the parent’s ministrations vis-à-vis the infant.

Bollas (1987) writes that he wants “to identify the infant’s first subjective experience of the object as a transformational object” (p.14). The “object” is, of course, the parent whose caring action “alters the infant’s environment to meet [the infant’s] needs” (p.15). The parent-object is not strictly speaking an object in the sense of the infant being able to differentiate between this or that object. More precisely, the parent-object is “a process that alters the infant’s experience” or subjectivity (p.13) by way of “enviro-somatic caring” (p.14; emphasis mine). Stated another way, the parent’s enviro-somatic caring is accurate attunement to the child’s assertions and, correspondingly, the infant’s pre-representational organization of experience. The main point here is that the parent’s caring actions transform the infant’s pre-representational subjectivity.

For Bollas, the parent “object is ‘known’ not so much by putting it into an object-representation, but as a recurrent experience of being” (p.13). The child’s “experience of being,” which is understood as pre-representational organizations of experience, precedes the child’s representational capacities (e.g., language, symbolization, etc.). This begs the question about what is meant by “experience of being” or transformation. Bollas is not clear here and to find our way to some clarity requires saying a bit more about the parent’s enviro-somatic caring.

The parent’s caring ministrations, which founds the communicative space in early infancy between the parent and child, can be further depicted in terms of personal recognition. To care for the infant the parent necessarily recognizes and treats the infant as a person—unique, inviolable, valued, responsive subject (Macmurray, 1991/1961), which is the ground for cooperative interactions between parent and infant. I add that personal recognition, which is foundational for good-enough attunements, entails a dialectical tension between identification and disidentification. The parent must identify with the child (like me) and disidentify with the child (she is not me) (Benjamin, 1995). This dialectical tension creates a space for the infant to appear. By this I mean, a space for the infant to assert his/her self (desires, needs, emotions etc.) with confidence—relational confidence that his/her assertions will be recognized. The dialectical personal recognition and the infant’s assertions form a cooperative interchange. I add that this dialectical tension of personal recognition vis-à-vis the parent’s attunement creates a communicative space for the child to assert him/herself and consequently to find and have affirmed a positive nascent, pre-representational self or what Bollas calls an experience of being, which I will say more about below.

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1 Macmurray was a philosopher who discussed the necessity of personal recognition for living a life in common. A number of care theorists (e.g., Engster, 2007; Hamington, 2004; Held, 2006; Noddings, 1984) contend that personal recognition is necessary for any acts of care. Parental personal recognition is particular in the sense that the parent’s recognition is shaped by the unique traits of the child. Yet, these recognitions are also joined to and shaped by the specific cultural, religious, and political narratives the parent possesses. Also, the parent’s personal recognition of the child is often intertwined with the parent’s fantasies, though a good enough parent will realize and let go of the fantasies that conflict with the child’s personality.

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The collapse of this dialectical tension toward one pole or the other signifies problems in caring ministrations, namely an attenuation of the communicative cooperative space and a deformation of subjectivity. Disidentification can take the form of depersonalization or objectification, which deforms the relation and the infant’s subjectivity. By deform I mean that the infant’s anxiety and pre-representational distrust are heightened, which accompanies the eclipse of a nascent positive self and the emergence of a negative pre-representational self—negative experience of being. Moreover, the parent’s disidentification means that cooperation will be interrupted and degraded. The movement toward the other pole, overidentification, means that the parent is projecting his/her cherished image onto the infant. Caring ministrations become tinged with the parent’s coercing the child to adopt the parent’s projection. This deforms the communicative space, cooperation, and subjectivity in that the infant’s experience of being becomes linked to having to adopt the parent’s projection for his/her own “positive” self. Winnicott would have called this a false self, which can be understood as deforming the infant’s experience of being in that his/her assertions must comply with the parent’s desires. The relation is deformed or marred by the parent’s failure to recognize the infant as a person—not-me and the parent’s attunement is similarly marred because it is infused with projections to which the infant is coerced to adopt.

Another important feature of enviro-somatic caring is the parent’s ability to recognize, acknowledge, and respond appropriately to relational disruptions. Numerous analytic researchers have noted the importance of relational repairs, not only regarding psychosocial development, but also therapy (see Richardson, 2010; Saffer & Muran, 1996, 2000; Tronick & Gianino 1986; Tronick & Cohn 1989). While Bollas does not mention repair, I believe it is very plausible that his view of the parent’s care would include this. I suggest further that relational repairs are transformational because the child gains a sense of confidence and trust that disruptions in the communicative space can be overcome and cooperation restored. Thus, the infant’s pre-representational experience of being (positive nascent self) remains secure in the midst of a relational disruption because of pre-representational confidence in the object/process.

It is important to stress further that this communicative process is relational and that the infant is not a mere passive recipient of care. Bollas argues that in adult life a transformational object “is pursued in order to surrender to it as a mechanism that alters the self, where the subject-as-suppliant now feels himself to be the recipient of enviro-somatic caring” (p.14; emphasis mine). It is plausible to infer here that the infant, likewise, surrenders to the parent’s ministrations, which suggests budding agency. As someone quite familiar with Donald Winnicott’s work, Bollas would have been acquainted with Winnicott’s (1975) contention that “birth can easily be felt by the infant” and s/he participates through “personal effort” (p.186). Personal effort implies a nascent ego and an infant’s pre-representational “belief” that s/he participates in the birth. Similarly, the infant is engaged in the care process not simply in the act of surrendering to it, but also before that in physically and vocally asserting his/her needs and desires. The parent’s personalizing attunements, then, are inextricably joined to the infant’s agentic surrender and assertions. In a good-enough communicative process, wherein the infant’s surrender and assertions are in concert with the parent’s personalizing

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2 I wish to mention that Erikson (1952) believed that the first stage of human development involved navigating trust-mistrust.
attunements, the TO/P transforms the infant’s experience of being by giving rise to a nascent positive agentic-self—pre-representational self-esteem, self-respect, and self-confidence.\(^3\)

What I have said so far is quite reasonable given Bollas’ view on this early developmental phase. I now take a bit of an interpretive leap or leaps.\(^4\) The presence of a pre-representational ego and positive self in the context of the parent’s ministrations accompanies the first stirrings and foundation of freedom. In other words, there is a liberative trace associated with transformational object/process. By this I mean that the transformational process is one of gradual differentiation whereby the child is not entirely captive to the facticity of his/her physical needs and desires. In the womb all needs are met automatically and naturally. There is no space between a need and the need being met or between need and desire. Therefore, there is no surrender. Once the child is born there is a space between need and it being met, which gives rise to nascent, pre-representational consciousness and surrender. To posit a nascent ego or “I” is already a trajectory from simple physical beingness to greater differentiation, which is supported by the parent’s proto-conversations with the infant, wherein the infant is recognized and treated as a person who can choose to act. This liberative element becomes increasingly evident as the child develops the capacity for language and narrative.

I linger here for a moment to consider Bollas’ view of transformational objects and aesthetic moments, because this further points to a liberative element in transformational object/process. Aesthetic moments, for Bollas (1987), “are fundamentally wordless occasions, notable for the density of the subject’s feelings and the fundamentally non-representational knowledge of being embraced by the aesthetic object” (p.31). Bollas considers a “Christian’s conversion experience, a poet’s reverie with his landscape, a listener’s rapture in a symphony, or a reader’s spell with his poem” (p.31) as examples where an adult’s experiences are connected to the trace of early transformational pre-representational experiences. Assuming Bollas is correct, these and other examples presuppose an adult’s individuation and freedom. The adult surrenders to the symphony and this surrender is done freely. The pleasure of the music, Bollas contends, is linked, in part, to the early pre-representational experiences of surrendering to the parent’s ministrations. The adult’s surrender, while significantly different from early infancy, is related to an infant’s surrender and nascent freedom. Negatively stated, parental deprivation and impingement evoke pre-representational anxiety/fear, distrust, and forced cooperation, which means that surrender becomes subjugation.

There is another important and related feature of transformational objects/processes. Philosopher Ortega y Gasset (1957) believed that infants are born open or existentially receptive to the parents’ care, without which there is no survival, let alone thriving. The ideas of “surrender” and “aesthetic” similarly suggest openness, a

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\(^3\) Honneth (2007a) develops the idea that personal recognition in the public-political realm leads to experiences of self-esteem, respect, and confidence, which are necessary for individuals to engage in social-political communicative spaces (pp.135-17).

\(^4\) Bollas, in writing about negative transformational objects and psychopathologies, does not explicitly address the topic of freedom or liberation, but I argue the idea of freedom is implied when he refers to the compulsions of persons’ seeking the perfect object to repair the basic fault—a basic fault that no doubt refers to failures in parents’ ministrations during infancy.
willingness to be moved by the enviro-somatic caring process, which could only take place in the presence of sufficient pre-representational trust, confidence, and hope, as well as a nascent ego to surrender. I push this further and contend that openness or surrender is foundational for learning, exploration, play/spontaneity, and later the capacity for self-reflection. Learning (and later self-reflection) cannot take place when individuals are closed off to new experiences, new ideas, etc. as a result of deep distrust, experiences of betrayal, and hopelessness. Openness, in other words, is threatened by the lack of care and corresponding relational disruptions, which accompany intolerable anxiety that interferes with learning and, later, the capacity for self-reflection—a deformational process. Positively stated, the parent’s care, which requires, in part, the limiting of the parent’s ego, makes possible the infant’s openness to receive care, which founds receptivity to the new and the different, which is the basis of learning and, later, self-reflection (Kavaler-Adler, 2007). I add here that if the parent can recognize and repair disruptions (infant participates), the infant will possess sufficient confidence and hope such that learning and exploration will not be impaired by disruptions.

To be sure, Bollas makes no mention of freedom, learning, and self-reflection with regard to transformational objects. Yet, his illustrations of negative transformational object/process would lend credence to my views. Ahab, Bollas (1987) writes, is captive to his “inner compulsion” that fuels his “impersonal and ruthless search for the whale” (p.27)—a negative transformational object/process. Ahab’s consciousness is singular in its focus and aim, restricting both his attention to other facets of his personality and life, as well as accountability for the needs of Others (except to the degree the Other’s needs are in line with Ahab’s preoccupation). Put another way, Ahab is closed to learning and self-reflection because he is obsessively preoccupied by his search for the whale. The reference to Ahab is quickly followed in the same paragraph with an allusion to the fanatic’s revolutionary ideology. Fanatics may be interested in gaining knowledge, facts, or information regarding their ideology (or enemy or whale), but they lack a genuine openness to learn (because they believe that they already possess the Truth) and correspondingly an inability or unwillingness vis-à-vis self-reflection and accountability. These and other negative illustrations indicate, in my view, that the attenuation of openness, learning, and self-reflection result from non-caring interactions that promote distrust, infidelity, hopelessness, and heighten anxiety.

To summarize, the transformational object/process signifies a relational, communicative process/space wherein parents’ personalizing attunements and repairs (care) occur in relation to infants’ assertions of needs and desires. The transformational object/process signifies 1) the infant’s pre-representational positive agentic self—experience of being (self-esteem, self-respect, and self-confidence), 2) pre-representational beliefs in and experiences of trust and confidence, 3) a nascent liberative element or freedom associated with the emergence of a budding agency or ego, and 4) openness joined to and necessary for learning and exploration. These, I argue, are attributes of the transformational object/process, which means they can be applied to any

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Axel Honneth (2007a) makes a similar point, arguing that the capacity to make reflective decisions is, in part, contingent on the “the permanence of the care shown to them by concrete others (p.189). I also point to the research of attachment theorists who show how a child’s capacities for reflection and autobiographical coherence are stunted by failures of parental care/attunement (Fonagy, Steel, Steel, Leigh, Kennedy, Matoon, & Target, 1995; Holmes 1996).
stage of development, though the particulars of transformation will be different. A brief example may help here. A parent sits and empathically listens to her teenage son talk about his fear and excitement about leaving home and going to college. In this communicative space the son asserts his views, while surrendering to the parent’s ministrations. This surrender presupposes a level of trust and confidence, which are associated with a positive self. In speaking to the parent openly (linked to the parent’s openness to receive), the teenager both expresses a sense of freedom, as well as hopes for a greater freedom associated with managing his anxiety. Finally, this good enough parent’s listening facilitates the son’s self-reflection, which is aimed at learning and deepening self-reflection. In this instance, there is no deformation of subjectivity or relations.

**Transformational objects and the political**

When discussing transformational objects/processes Bollas is primarily concerned with demonstrating the relevance of the notion with regard to two distinct, but related spaces, namely the parent-infant interaction and the therapist-patient interaction. He relies primarily on case studies as evidence of this connection, though he does not demonstrate how the consulting room and parent-infant relationship are related other than to state that there is an archaic trace in some patients’ experiences and relating. Similarly, his brief comment about revolutionaries posits a connection, even if it is a trace, between transformational object/process in infancy and adult political activities and ideas, but he does not explain how this can be so. What, in other words, is the connection between early infancy interactions and the adult radical revolutionary? As stated above, if transformational objects are identified in terms of attributes, it is plausible to identify transformational objects throughout lifespan development, which means that we are no longer concerned with simply linking adult behavior with the archaic trace of pre-representational experiences of early infancy. Yet, this begs the question about the relation between transformational objects, vis-à-vis childhood (and adulthood), and the political realm. Is there a connection between the subjectivity and interactions of parents and children and political spaces? In this section, I argue that while the communicative space/relational of early childhood is distinct from the political, there is an existential overlap and this overlap serves as a bridge toward using Bollas’ concept to assess and understand political dynamics and subjectivity. More particularly, the pre-political space of parent-child communications has existential features akin to complex political, communicative processes and subjectivities. This enables me to aver that the concept “transformational objects” is relevant in two distinct spheres, namely the pre-political

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6 The term “pre-political space” has two interrelated meanings. First, it refers to interactions (and subjectivity) that take place within the context of family relations, which are not directly political. A parent feeding an infant, for instance, is not participating in the public-political realm. That said, the notion of pre-political does not mean political realities do not influence parent-child relations and subjectivities. Reading James Baldwin, Malcolm X, or Ta-Nehisi Coates reveals that the political realities of racism have very real impacts on parent-child interactions and subjectivities, which provides further evidence of the plausible use of psychoanalytic concepts in analyzing the political realm. Second, “pre-political space” is a reference to the space that precedes and founds communicative spaces of the political realm. By “found” I mean that without this pre-political space there is a diminishment of later communicative processes.

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space of childhood and political realities. In saying the concept is relevant does not suggest an identity regarding these two realms. Rather, it merely indicates that the concept and its attributes can be used to assess critically communicative spaces of both, while recognizing significant differences. In so doing, the concept “transformational object/process” becomes applicable as a critical interpretive lens in understanding and assessing public-political realities.

Let me briefly summarize what I mean by the pre-political space of the parent-infant interaction. A good enough parent founds the pre-political space through acts of care—accurately attuning to the infant’s assertions of needs and desires and repairing relational disruptions. The very basis of care is the parent’s recognition and treatment of the child as a person—a unique, valued, inviolable, responsive subject. The parents’ personalizing recognition and treatment foster a space for the child to appear, by which I mean to assert his/her desires and needs. This communicative interaction is necessary for the child’s construction of a positive, agentic self vis-à-vis this relational space. Put another way, the parent’s reliable personal recognition and treatment accompany the child’s trust and confidence to freely surrender and assert him/herself vis-vis the parent. To be sure, there is some compliance in parent-child interactions, but this is secondary to the child’s experience and exercise of freedom or spontaneity.7

This existential, developmental view of pre-political space resonates with Hannah Arendt’s political notion “space of appearances” and Hegel’s (Honneth, 2007a) view of communicative spaces. The political, for Arendt, refers to the communicative activity of citizens wherein public-political institutions (and attending policies, programs, laws, etc.) are created to address the various needs and concerns of citizens (Arendt, 1952, p.198). This communicative activity/space is inextricably yoked to shared narratives and rituals that contain a people’s beliefs, meanings, expectations, and hopes or visions (Honneth, 2007a, pp.218-239), all of which ideally founds mutual personal recognition and action in the public-political realm (Macmurray, 1991a/1957, 1991/1961). This interpersonal recognition has important psychological and political consequences. Axel Honneth (2007a) points out that Arendt “claims that human subjects are naturally dependent on being perceived and affirmed in a public sphere, for it is only in this way that they can acquire the measure of psychic stability and self-confidence needed to cope with their existential problems and risks” (pp.30-31). More positively stated, the communicative activity of the polis, Arendt argues, is “the public-political realm in which [persons] attain their full humanity, not only because they are (as in the privacy of the household) but also because they appear” (Arendt, 2005, p.21). For Honneth, a Hegelian, this political-communicative space ideally facilitates citizens’ self-confidence, self-esteem, and self-respect in the public realm.

7 Honneth (2010) explicates Hegel’s view of freedom and its relation to justice and self-realization. For Hegel, “subjects were connected from the start by intersubjective relations” (p.8). The individual subject experiences freedom by participating in the communicative space of social relationships wherein they are recognized as persons and “each subject is able to perceive the liberty of the other as the prerequisite of his own self-realization” (p.8). While Hegel was writing about adults, we could view the pre-political space of infant-parent relations in an analogous way, except, of course, the infant is unable to recognize the parent as a person or that the infant’s freedom is contingent on the liberty of the parent.
In brief, the public-political “space of appearances” means that the humanity or personhood of individual citizens is recognized and affirmed, which bolsters individuals’ confidence and agency vis-à-vis participating in and cooperating with others in the polis. Added to this is Honneth’s (2007a) view that “individual subjects are only capable of experiencing themselves as free beings if they have learned to be actively engaged in public discussion of political affairs” (p.30). Later he writes that “social recognition constitutes the normative expectations connected with our entering into communicative relationships” (71). His view is derived from his interpretation of Hegel who argued that communicative relationships, wherein there exists mutual personal recognition, are basic goods necessary for the sake of realizing freedom in the political realm (Honneth, 2010, p.15). To “appear” in the political space, then, means that the humanity or personhood of individuals is recognized and affirmed, which, in turn, means individuals exercise political agency and freedom vis-à-vis their own and Others’ survival and flourishing—self-realization for Hegel. Thus, the polis’ “space of appearances” ideally provides individuals the self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem to communicate and freely engage with Others in the public-political realm and in cooperating toward the common good (Honneth, 1995, p.129).

It is important to say a bit more about the space of appearances and cooperation in the polis. Recognition of the Other as a person is the basis of any act of care, whether it is opening a door for someone in need or parents helping their children to read. The process of caring, as indicated above, is inextricably connected to mutual trust necessary for cooperation and for developing and maintaining a positive sense of self—to be with oneself in the other. It is difficult to imagine that the communicative processes of a polis would not have some basic level of mutual civic care/respect and civic trust even in political contestations—at least in a viable and vibrant polis. Yet it is also important to take note of examples of a polis’ communicative processes that accompany depersonalization and distrust, which undermine cooperation toward the common good, as well as negatively impacting freedom and self-realization. A Hobbesian society, which is grounded in the “primal act of recognition as enmity” (Wolin, 2016, p.418), for example, is hardly one that promotes mutual personal recognition, care, trust, and cooperation. This is why Hobbes posited a powerful Leviathan to enforce cooperation among competing citizens—an anthropological view Hegel found deeply flawed because of its failure to understand the idea that self-realization and freedom are conditioned and founded intersubjectively. This dystopian vision of the polis is also contrasted with John Macmurray’s (1991/1961) neo-Kantian view that in a good-enough polis “each cares for all others and no one for himself” (p.159) and Hegel’s view where freedom and self-realization are contingent upon mutual recognition and cooperation (Honneth, 2010,

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8 There is an important point here that I cannot pursue in depth. Honneth (2010) argues that Hegel’s view of freedom served as a corrective to Hobbes and Kant. Freedom or free-will develops intersubjectively. That is, communicative relations enable “the individual subject to be ‘with oneself in the other’” (p.16). This can be further understood as subjects mutually seeing each other “as constituting a condition of their own freedom” (p.50). To return to the pre-political space of the infant-parent relation, the parent is clearly the condition of the child’s nascent freedom and openness, though naturally unable to recognize this. Ideally, as adults we acknowledge that mutual personal recognition is the necessary condition of freedom and self-realization.
p.51). It is not difficult to imagine that this version of the polis possesses a dynamic space of appearances wherein mutual personal recognitions are the ground for social-political cooperation toward the common good.

The polis’ space of appearances, as Arendt notes, is connected to political and social-cultural institutions that foster or inhibit the space of appearances and attending communicative processes. In other words, political institutions and leaders may be said to represent, participate in, and promote political-communicative processes that shape the polis’ space of appearances. Obvious negative examples are leaders and social-political institutions that promoted slavery (depersonalization) and later Jim Crow laws (humiliation and subjugation). Both annihilated and later attenuated the space of appearances and civic care for African Americans, which, in turn, meant that freedom and self-realization were completely denied or later restricted—what Orlando Patterson (1982) called “social death.” The attenuation or collapse of the space of appearances represents the public-political eclipse of personal recognition, the undermining of civic care, the eclipse of self-esteem, self-respect, and self-confidence in the public-political realm, the absence of parity of participation, the heightening of distrust (in this case, between whites and blacks), and the weakening or loss of political agency and cooperation toward the common good. In addition, the attenuation of the space of appearances by whites who believe in the delusion of white supremacy means an absence of self-reflection/accountability. In short, the collapse of the space of appearances results in distorted civic subjectivities and relations.

Given this, how then are we to understand transformational objects in light of communicative processes in the political realm? Positively stated, transformational objects in the polis involve individuals, institutions, public-political practices, and communicative processes that promote mutual-personal recognition and civic care/respect, which provide members with public-political self-esteem, self-respect, and self-confidence necessary for public-political participation and cooperation. Mutual personal recognition and cooperation manifest the intersubjective exercise of agentic freedom, self-reflection, mutual learning, and the cooperative pursuit of self-realization, while living a life in common. In other words, members of the polis have sufficient trust and openness to learn from each other, to exercise their agency, and to realize their positive political selves in the communicative space wherein there is mutual personal recognition. Given that the polis is also a space of contestation, which the idea of “space of appearances” takes into account, there must be sufficient confidence and hope in a good-enough polis such that contestation will not undermine civic care/respect, as well as political trust, agency, communication, and cooperation. Moreover, this hope in the face of contestation in political spaces attends reparative processes, which are attempts to re-establish the space of appearances, public trust, and civic cooperation.⁹ Consider the Civil Rights Movement as a brief illustration of transformational object/process that took place against the backdrop of white political carelessness, violence, perfidy, and, correspondingly, the attenuation of the space of appearances vis-à-vis African Americans. Religious and political leaders engaged in non-violent public-political actions aimed at affirming the mutual-personal recognition of African Americans, which, led to the demand for, affirmation of, and exercise of African Americans’ public-political self-

⁹ See Arendt’s The Promise of Politics, wherein she discusses the necessity for forgiveness and reparative processes associated with justice.
esteem, self-confidence, and self-respect as equal citizens. This mutual-personal recognition and affirmation of positive subjectivities meant the exercise of public-political agency toward achieving their common good and the common good of all citizens—a parity of participation in the polis’ space of appearances. This included an openness to engage and cooperate with people of all races, though, of course, white supremacists declined the invitation out of hatred and fear (Anderson, 2016). This political movement, accompanying much contestation, partially transformed not only the political realm, but also the subjectivities and relations of many black and white persons.

In summary, the pre-political communicative space between child and parent and the political space of appearances are related by virtue of personal recognition, care, trust, and the presence of a positive self—self-confidence, self-esteem, and self-respect. I add that the pre-representational liberative experiences and personal recognition as foundational for exploration, learning, and self-reflection are precursors to the polis’ space of appearances and its relation to political freedom and self-realization. There are, of course, numerous differences between these communicative spaces, not the least of which are symbolization and more complex communications and behaviors (e.g., political rituals). Yet, these differences, in my view, do not mean non-identity. More to the point, the connection between these spaces makes possible the use of TO/Ps in diagnosing the political realm.

**Pervasive Political Humiliation as Negative Transformational Object/Process**

There is sufficient foundation laid to discuss negative transformational objects/processes in the political realm. I imagine that all societies have negative transformational objects/processes, signifying the presence of social-political pathologies. Of course, there may be occasions when negative transformational objects/processes are more prevalent, while positive transformational objects are in decline or mostly absent. I suggest that presently in the U.S., negative transformational objects/processes are rife with the rise of pervasive political humiliations represented by the communicative style of Donald Trump and his avid supporters. In other words, Donald Trump represents the kind of political objects/processes that deform subjectivities and social relations in the political realm. Before making the case, let me first say a bit more about political humiliation and what I mean by negative transformational objects/processes vis-à-vis the processes associated with political humiliation.

Philosopher Avishai Margalit (1996) stated that a “decent society is one whose institutions do not humiliate people” (p.1). Invoking Sartre, Margalit contends that humiliating people is a kind of rejection and objectification that undermines their sense of control and freedom (p.117). Recognizing “a human being as a thing…is seeing him as unfree” (p.117). For Margalit political humiliation is “an existential threat. It is based on the fact that the perpetrator—especially the institutional humiliator—has power over the victim he assails” (p.122). It is important to stress that Margalit is not writing about a single person, but persons and institutions that are involved in humiliating persons, thus undermining their public-political control and freedom. I add to Margalit’s view, arguing that political humiliation is an attempt to undermine or obliterate the person’s positive public-political self (self-confidence, self-esteem, self-respect), which means, using Arendt’s term, denying the Other parity of participation in the polis’ space of appearances. As Fraser and Honneth (2003) note, misrecognition in the public-political
realm, like humiliation, not only negatively impacts parity of participation, it also has material (and psychosocial) consequences vis-à-vis the distribution of goods and services necessary for persons’ political agency, as well as their survival and flourishing. In brief, political humiliation a) deforms subjectivity by undermining public-political self-esteem, confidence, respect, and relations and b) deforms social relations by diminishing political participation and cooperation.

An obvious example of political humiliation in U.S. history is racism and its varied forms of terror, control, dehumanization, and rejection of African Americans. It is necessary to say that many African Americans resisted this, whether by forming religious communities that secured a positive self and/or actively rebelling against racist policies, laws, and non-judicial practices (e.g., Nat Turner, Fredrick Douglass, Fanny Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., etc.). Another current example of pervasive political humiliation is how citizens and public-political institutions recognize and treat poor people (Wacquant, 2009; Soss, Fording & Sanford, 2011; Desmond, 2016). The effectiveness of political humiliation depends on how it is institutionalized (i.e., disciplinary regimes), as well as how it is supported by citizens. Let me state further that simply because a person and his/her followers use political humiliation as a tactic does not mean it is always effective (e.g., Elizabeth Warren seems hardly affected by Trump’s attempts to humiliate her). Nevertheless, humiliation is, as Margalit indicates, a threat to the body politic because it attempts to undermine mutual-personal recognition and freedom, which are necessary for democratic participation and cooperation.

Before moving to an illustration, let me connect the idea of political humiliation to the notion of negative transformational objects/processes. In general, negative transformational objects attenuate a polis’ space of appearances through communicative processes that reflect types of misrecognition or non-recognition—usually in the forms of humiliations (e.g., objectification, disrespect, degradation, and depersonalization). These kinds of misrecognitions are frequently supported by narratives, institutions, and practices, which means they have psychological, social, and material effects on those who are depersonalized. Naturally, negative transformational objects/processes are not simply single individuals, but rather represent a group or groups of citizens working and cooperating to undermine the self-respect, self-esteem, and self-confidence of their perceived opponents—attempts to deform their public-political subjectivity and restrict or deny participation in the space of appearances (deformed civic relations and freedom). Negative transformational objects also represent processes wherein the humiliating group attempts to secure their own self-realization and freedom, while attempting to deny the self-realization and freedom of their adversaries. In other words, negative transformational objects are anti-liberative. Unsurprisingly, the practice of humiliation and securing the in-group’s dominance vis-à-vis the common good heightens distrust, which attends a corresponding lack of openness toward being with, cooperating with, and learning from those who are ignored, demeaned, or depersonalized. This lack of openness to learning is accompanied by a dearth of self-reflective accountability for one’s misrecognitions and actions toward demeaned Others. Racists’, for instance, are not only exclusionary, they are also remarkably and demonstrably unreflective/unaccountable for their acts of humiliating Others. When negative transformational objects/processes dominate the political landscape, we are living in a Hobbesian society, wherein the fundamental social relation is one of enmity; it is a society where political distrust prevails, negative public
representations are enforced on Others, and parity of participation (freedom) is a sham. In short, negative transformational objects represent a deformation of social-political relations and, correspondingly, attempts to deform the opponents’ public-political subjectivity.

To argue that Donald Trump represents a negative transformational object, I need to begin with his campaign. One of the tactics Trump used during (and after) the campaign was to ridicule and demean his opponents (e.g., crooked Hillary, Ted Cruz a maniac, Jeb Bush a total disaster, Comey a failed leader). The tactic was an attempt to undermine the credibility of his opponents and, thus, to insure he won the primaries and the overall election. His political opponents were not the only people to experience this tactic. Trump used the media for his own gains, but also viewed and treated the media (except Fox News) as enemies. He often ridiculed reporters and went out of his way to humiliate a reporter who had a disability (Bessler, 2015). Other targets included his misogynistic and violent comments toward women, which came to light through a radio show that took place some years previously (Graham, 2016). Also, his racist and xenophobic comments toward Hispanic people and Muslims were well known. All of this reflects pervasive types of misrecognition, which fall under the heading of social-political humiliation. I need to stress here that Trump’s behavior was enthusiastically supported by many people in his base, who commended him for speaking his mind or simply dismissed his blatant misogynistic (e.g., locker room talk) and xenophobic comments as unimportant.

It is necessary to note that Trump’s (and his supporters') attempts to humiliate and degrade people who he deemed to be opponents/threats has been seen in American politics long before Trump arrived on the scene. Smear campaigns are evident in the earliest decades of U.S. political history. Usually, once a victor emerges there are attempts to join hands and to acknowledge our shared American identity and assurance that the newly elected President represents and cares about all Americans. This is not mere illusion. There is, in other words, some attempt to repair the space of appearances and civic distrust, which result from polarizing campaign seasons. When Trump won the presidency, his tactic of humilitating anyone or group (or institutions like the FBI) that opposed or threatened him not only continued but escalated. Both during his campaign and after his inauguration, Trump revealed a consistent political tactic of humiliating real and imagined foes—political misrecognition on steroids.

The tactic of social-political humiliation can be understood as a political process that aims to reduce the space of appearances and political agency (freedom) in the polis by undermining the self-respect, esteem, and confidence of one’s opponents, while solidifying one’s base of support vis-à-vis participation in the political space. In other words, political humiliation is, for Margalit (1996), an injury to persons’ self-respect (p.19), which accompanies “encroachment on the individual’s sovereignty” or political agency (p.13). The attempt to attenuate the polis’ space of appearances through political humiliation means that humiliated Others are marginalized from agentic participation in the polis’ communicative practices and processes. An obvious example of this is the restriction of political events to supporters during Trump’s campaign. There were, for example, several videos showing persons protesting Trump and his behavior or views and their subsequent (sometimes violent) removal from the event. These practices are unmistakable evidence of a foreclosure of the political space.

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Of course, whether this tactic of public-political humiliation is effective overall, is another question. In an ostensibly democratic society this approach may serve to galvanize the opposition, which seems to be the case here. But this does not mean either that the tactic is completely ineffective or that it is not aimed at undermining the space of appearances. One reason that Trump’s types of misrecognition are not more effective is that there are political-public institutions that refuse to enforce this political leader’s desire to humiliate opponents in physical and material ways. In other words, there are some democratic protections, though some news outlets, like Fox News, are part of the process of humiliation. That said, people, like Madeleine Albright (2018), recognize that Trump and his supporters threaten a democratic polis’ space of appearances, though the object of Albright’s fear is the rise of fascism. Fascism and its institutionalized policies of misrecognition are not mere name-calling, but deliberate violent state actions that eject “opponents” from participating in civil society—the space of appearances. There are, in other words, state institutions that suppress the political agency of a group of citizens—deforming political subjectivity and relations. Of course, we do not have to make the connection to Nazi Germany to illustrate the tactic of misrecognition and violent humiliation that are supported by public and political institutions in the history of the United States. As mentioned above, consider the long public-political humiliation of African Americans, which not only undermined their participation in political processes, but had significant negative impacts on the distribution of resources needed to survive and thrive. Moreover, white supremacists’ misrecognitions, which were institutionalized (legally and illegally), were aimed at undermining African Americans self-confidence, esteem, and respect in the public-political realm—deforming their political subjectivity (agency) and deforming the relations between whites and blacks. The result of racism’s systemic humiliation was a kind of social-political death (JanMohamed, 2005). To return to the present day, thankfully, some of the democratic political institutions and processes have mitigated the impact of Trump’s and his followers’ misrecognitions.

Political misrecognition in the form of humiliation undermines civic trust necessary for cooperation in a democracy. There is always some distrust in society between individuals and groups. At times, this can be acknowledged, and attempts can be made to restore some semblance of trust. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is an example of a process that sought to begin to work at restoring some social-political trust after decades of political-material humiliation associated with apartheid. There are also examples of mediation (political and judicial), wherein people contesting different political positions or people who have been aggrieved cooperate to find agreed upon solutions. Trump’s tactic of humiliating his opponents, his unwillingness to recognize and treat his opponents as persons, his ongoing attempts to undermine democratic institutions (e.g., press, judiciary, congress) whenever they are seen to be obstacles, insures greater distrust between political opponents. This means that

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10 I feel it is necessary to qualify this statement. There is evidence that Trump’s approaches have motivated millions of people to be more engaged in the political process. That said, there has been a long-standing systemic approach to humiliating the poor by Republicans and neoliberal Democrats (Desmond, 2016). Not surprisingly, poor persons are less likely to vote, not simply because of social-political humiliation, but also because they the lack realistic trust and hope that someone will represent them. In short, political humiliation is very effective when it is enshrined in institutions and practices.
there is less motivation to cooperate with one’s opponents, which is evident in the lack of cooperation among the different party lawmakers in Congress. In other words, social polarization exacerbated by political humiliation increases distrust and with it a fragmentation of shared political agency vis-à-vis the space of appearances. I add that political humiliation includes increased attempts to restrict political agency to the group in power (attenuation of the space of appearances), which erodes public trust vis-à-vis persons in othered groups. For instance, it is common that a new administration staffs its cabinet with people who will carry out the values and vision of the party. However, Trump has nominated people for cabinet positions that work to exclude the voices and values of opponents, while undermining long held protections (Davenport, 2017; Renae & Jan, 2018). This near fanatical focus on dismantling long held protections may cement trust among Trump’s loyal base, but it undermines the trust and confidence of other citizens vis-à-vis political leaders and institutions.11

Political humiliation also deforms subjectivity (and social relations) by reducing or eliminating openness to learning from despised and humiliated Others. To say more about this, it is helpful to start with a positive depiction. In a decent society, to use Margalit’s term, there is sufficient trust and respect not only for public cooperation, but for learning from each other so that cooperation can take place and be effective in realizing shared political-public aims—the common good. That is, a decent society possesses a vital space of appearances, wherein communicative processes are grounded in mutual-personal recognition, as well as the possibility for repair of political-public disruptions. This is why political personal recognition, which is the basis of the polis’ space of appearances and civic trust, has value in the sense of people learning from each other toward achieving shared aims and working through contestations. By contrast, it is difficult to imagine citizens cooperating if they are consistently humiliated. I am not aware of any instance when Elizabeth Warren, Barak Obama, John Kasich, and Jeb Bush—all targets of humiliating rhetoric—have been asked or sought to work with Trump. It is important to stress that the people doing the humiliation lack the motivation to learn from and cooperate with the Other—reflecting a distorted subjectivity and relation. Political humiliation, in brief, is fundamentally alienating, which accompanies an eclipse of motivation to learn from despised Others.

Another feature of negative transformational objects is the lack of accountability or capacity for self-reflection. Reporter Natalie Walters (2016) interviewed candidate Trump and noticed that his desk at work was covered with magazines and newspapers, all of which had to do with Donald Trump. His preoccupation about or obsession with his image/brand and desire to be in the news represents an absence of self-reflective capacities. Over two decades ago reporter Mark Singer (1997) observed that Trump was an “efficient schmoozer.” Singer described Trump in this way:

His dead-on ability to exploit other people’s weaknesses; the perpetual seventeen-year-old who lives in a zero-sum world of winners and “total losers,” loyal friends and “complete scumbags”; the insatiable publicity hound who courts the press on a daily basis and, when he doesn’t like what he reads, attacks the messengers as “human garbage”; the chairman

and largest stockholder of a billion-dollar public corporation who seems unable to resist heralding overly optimistic earnings projections, which then fail to materialize, thereby eroding the value of his investment—in sum, a fellow both slippery and naïve, artfully calculating and recklessly heedless of consequences.”

Trump, Singer wrote, is a man “with universal recognition but with a suspicion that an interior life was an intolerable inconvenience.” Both Singer and Waters are pointing to Trump’s lack of self-reflection and seeming inability to take accountability for anything deemed to be negative about himself. This was evident throughout his campaign and continues in his presidency.

A leader who depends on humiliation and who lacks thoughtfulness and accountability will model this for those who follow him/her. This is a trait of a negative transformational object/process because without accountability there is little hope that relations in the polis between the humiliators and the humiliated will be repaired. As Hannah Arendt (2005) notes, a vibrant polis possesses the promise of forgiveness and forgiveness requires some degree of self-reflection and accountability. Tyrants and bullies, like Trump, depend on humiliating opponents and represent negative TO/Ps that diminish the possibility of repairing breaches in the web of the polis.

The tactic of political humiliation is not the only example of deforming subjectivity and social relations, but before continuing I wish to clarify a bit more regarding political humiliation and deforming subjectivity and social relations. Clearly social relations and the space of appearances are deformed when political humiliation is rife because of a lack of personal recognition and trust. Of course, it might appear that Trump and his supporters’ subjectivities and their social relations are not deformed because they exhibit mutual personal recognition and trust among themselves. I argue that individuals and groups that depend on and share in political humiliation of Others signify a kind of deformed political subjectivity/agency and relation among themselves despite their cooperation with each other. Consider the extreme groups that tack to Trump’s side, such as white supremacist groups. These groups depend on shared hatred for their political cohesion—a hatred that accompanies desires to humiliate, subjugate, or eliminate blacks, Hispanics, Jews, Muslims, etc. Despite group cooperation and affection, their political subjectivity is deformed, because they, like Ahab, are enthralled by and captive to hatred (and unacknowledged fear). Their hatred and preoccupation with the illusion of white supremacy forecloses accountability and freedom, as well as any possibility of mutual-personal recognition of and learning about and from despised Others. Trump may publicly decry these groups, but his penchant for humiliating anyone who is deemed to oppose him represents a similar kind of deformed and deforming political subjectivity.

It is also important to point out that attempts to undermine the self-respect, esteem, and confidence of one’s political opponents do not necessarily lead to the deformation of the opponents’ subjectivity. As indicated above, when political humiliation is linked to dominant narratives and social-political and cultural institutions, then it is far more likely that the Others’ subjectivities will be deformed, which is evident in low political self-confidence, esteem, and respect. Yet, even in these circumstances despised Others, as noted above, may find ways to preserve and protect their civic
esteem, respect, and confidence, even as they are excluded from participating in the public-political space of appearances. Naturally, many people succumbed to pervasive and systemic racism, as James Baldwin (1984) depicts when talking about his father: “He was defeated long before he died because, at the bottom of his heart, he really believed what white people said about him” (p.4). Nevertheless, persons and groups may work—work that requires self-reflection and accountability—to preserve civic trust, freedom, and space of appearances despite attempts to undermine or destroy their civic self-confidence, self-esteem, and self-respect.

In summary, Trump (and his ardent supporters) represents a deformational object/process in the sense that he obsessively uses political humiliation to communicate and solidify his base and to protect his brand. I argued that this tactic signifies ongoing practices of misrecognition (supported by his followers) toward opponents (individuals, groups, institutions). The tactic of political humiliation is an attempt to deny the Other positive-public/political self (self-respect, self-esteem, and self-confidence), which, in turn, accompanies attempts to diminish the Other’s participation (political agency/freedom) in the polis’ space of appearances. Not surprisingly, negative transformational processes, such as political humiliation, attends a lack of openness toward learning from the Other—learning that is necessary for civic cooperation. The decline of civic cooperation means there is an absence of social-political trust necessary for civic cooperation toward the common good for all members of the society. In addition, with regard to those who use political humiliation, I argued that their subjectivity is deformed because of both a preoccupation with image/brand (attenuation of freedom), which attends a lack of accountability (capacity for self-reflection) for the consequences of using this tactic and lack of accountability means there is little likelihood of repairing the polis’ space of appearance.

Sites of Resisting Negative Transformational Objects

The interpretive frameworks used to analyze social pathologies, more often than not, contain a vision or idea of cure or health. This, I believe, is true in my discussion of above, yet here I want to highlight briefly several sites that resist or counter negative transformational processes in society. One such site of resistance and hope is psychoanalytic psychotherapy or more broadly therapies that create spaces that encourage, through care and trust, self-reflection, accountability, agency, and cooperation. Consider, for instance, psychoanalyst Franz Fanon who lived in Algeria under the threat of daily humiliations and violence by French colonizers. Fanon (2008/1952) argued that the aims of psychotherapy are (a) “to ’consciousnessize’ [the patient’s] unconscious, to no longer be tempted by a hallucinatory lactification,” and (b) “to enable [the patient] to choose an action with respect to the real source of the conflict, i.e., the social structure” (p. 80; emphasis mine). Fanon saw firsthand the negative effects of pervasive humiliation on the lives of individuals, families, and communities. In my view, Fanon, as a psychiatrist, sought to create an analytic space where individuals could experience sufficient care and trust to cooperate in reflecting on their lives for the sake of acting toward the real social sources of their suffering. In so doing, analysis could function as a transformational, liberative space to further self-worth, self-respect, and
self-confidence, as well as further agency and cooperation vis-à-vis the political realm (LaMothe, 2017).12

Naturally, psychoanalytic therapies are limited because of their individual focus. Other communal or organizational sites of positive transformational processes have been mentioned above. For instance, during the Jim Crow era, African American religious communities served as sites of resistance, wherein they fostered within their members self-respect, self-worth, and self-confidence in the face of the daily humiliations of racism (e.g., Hendricks, 2011). I also noted above African American religious communities and their leaders advocated for the full participation of Black persons in civil society and did so using methods that did not involve humiliating White people. Indeed, many of these organizations sought to cooperate with White people who also were interested in social justice. And when we consider the leaders and participants engaged in non-violent civil disobedience in the face of political humiliation, one notes the significant amount of self-reflection and accountability needed to do this. This work is and was not confined to religious communities. African Americans developed and develop organizations (e.g., NAACP, Black Lives Matter, Poor Peoples Campaign) that advocate for justice, mutual political-personal recognition, and civic cooperation.

There are other organizations and institutions that either help safeguard against the proliferation of negative transformational objects/processes such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) or limit their effects. We might also consider democratic and judicial institutions that put the brakes on some egregious attempts to debase people, like halting the separation of children from parents who are seeking refuge in the United States. Investigative media outlets can also serve to refute propaganda aimed at humiliating people or expose the political use of what are considered “dog whistles” or code words (e.g., Cadillac driving welfare queens).

The existence of social-political pathologies depend on institutions, communicative processes, and individuals/groups to enact psychological, social, and material humiliation vis-à-vis other residents, distorting subjectivity and social relations. Positive transformational objects/processes (institutions organizations, communities) are aimed at securing mutual personal recognition and trust. Even in the face of social-political pathologies, these positive transformational objects/processes give rise to self-esteem, self-confidence, and self-respect necessary for civic cooperation.

Conclusion
In general, social-political pathologies represent distorted subjectivities and social relations. An emended version of Bollas’ negative transformational objects/processes can help frame the social pathology of communicative processes linked to humiliation. What is clear is that these objects/processes (1) undermine civic respect or the mutual-personal recognition necessary for positive public-political subjectivity, (2) heighten social-political distrust, which corrupts the polis’ space of appearances and civic cooperation,

12 Interestingly, around the same time and on another continent, Ralph Ellison (1995/1953), commenting about the psychiatric clinic in Harlem, wrote “As such, and in spite of the very fine work it is doing, a thousand LaFargue (psychiatric) clinics could not dispel the sense of unreality that haunts Harlem. Knowing this, Dr. Wertham and his interracial staff seek a modest achievement: to give each bewildered patient an insight into the relation between his problems and his environment, and out of this understanding to reforge the will” (p.302).
(3) foreclose openness to learning and social-political accountability, and (4) attenuate freedom because of a shared obsessive preoccupation with achieving and maintaining political dominance. In diagnosing social-political pathologies, there is the possibility of choosing actions that establish and participate in positive transformational processes that foster mutual-personal recognition, civic trust, shared self-reflection, and parity of participation in the political-public realm.

References


Ryan LaMothe is Professor of Pastoral Care and Counseling at Saint Meinrad Seminary and School of Theology. He has written extensively on psychoanalysis, psychology of religion, and politics. Two recent books are Missing Us: Re-Envisioning Psychoanalysis from the Perspective of Community and Care of Persons and Care of Polis: Toward a Political Pastoral Theology.